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Misadventures in Political Philosophy
Mahon O’Brien on the right sort of question to ask about Heidegger’s philosophy and politics
The recent furore surrounding the publication of some of Heidegger’s notebooks from the 1930s
and 40s has been a cause celebre of the intellectual world for the last couple of years. Toward the
end of 2013, a handful of sensational passages from Heidegger’s by now infamous Schwarze
Hefte (Black Notebooks) were leaked (prior to their ofﬁcial publication in the Spring of 2014) and
subsequently went ‘viral’. The immediate effect was the re-ignition of the controversy surrounding
Heidegger’s support for National Socialism and the relevance of that political allegiance to his
philosophy. Alas, the controversy began to play itself out (and has largely proceeded) along
disappointingly familiar lines. That is to say, many of the people who immediately weighed in on
the debate managed to kick up so much dust (dust which had only just resettled in the wake of
Emmanuel Faye’s outrageous polemic) that people were left ﬂailing around aimlessly without
making any real progress. Not only that, the controversy was raging full throttle before the
notebooks had even appeared. Thus, one has to suppose that the people who shouted loudest at
this time were simply reprising views they already held as members of a rather partisan ideological
philosophical ‘club’.
What is overlooked on each and every occasion that this controversy erupts is the way this debate
polarizes, with many participants becoming embroiled in something of a phony war. That is to say,
if either side proved correct, then there would be no real controversy. As I argued in my Heidegger,
History, and the Holocaust:
[…] the controversy continues to be prosecuted by two polarized groups who continue to
miss the question that should exercise all of us; these camps either try to nullify
Heidegger’s Nazism and insist on his greatness as a philosopher as though the two are
mutually exclusive or else they look to amplify his Nazism and diminish his stature as a
philosopher—again—as though the notion of a great philosopher and a Nazi are mutually
exclusive identities […] the question that needs to be addressed is not so much whether
Heidegger is a good philosopher or a charlatan; if he is in fact a charlatan, then his
political views are of little consequence. And again, as should by now be patently clear, if
Heidegger wasn’t really a Nazi, then, in that case, there is really nothing for us to concern
ourselves with, the controversy instantly dissolves. Moreover, if there is in fact no
connection between Heidegger’s philosophy and his political actions and views, then
there would, again, be little reason for us to concern ourselves.
The apologetics of deniers who wanted to maintain the image of Heidegger as nothing less than
some celestial, non-sublunary exemplar who had only accidentally engaged with National
Socialism for a moment in the early 1930s needed to be dismissed. And indeed, the recent
notebooks have at least served one useful function in helping to debunk this particular myth; since
the publication of the notebooks, Heideggerians can no longer credibly maintain that Heidegger
was not an anti-semite or that his political views are completely unrelated to his philosophy.
Furthermore, the intransigence of commentators who doggedly subscribe to the view that
Heidegger is a philosophical charlatan is not somehow rendered philosophically plausible by the
conﬁrmation of the simple fact that Heidegger was at one point a vocal supporter of National
Socialism. Their position is weakened further by the fact that many of them proudly profess to
never really haven taken the time to try and read Heidegger at all.
I had been convinced that the Heidegger controversy was something that needed to be revisited
anew for some time—long before there was any mention of the notorious Schwarze Hefte. The
question that needed to be addressed, and which I address at some length in my recent work, is
whether there is, in fact, any relationship between Heidegger’s philosophy and his political views.
In order to ask this question, however, a lot of detritus left over from previous controversies
needed to be cleared away.
Granted, a number of Heideggerians had looked to offer a more measured, albeit still somewhat
wrongheaded, response to some of these issues following the initial shockwaves caused by the
appearance of Victor Farias’s book in the late 80s when, along with the ﬁndings of the Freiburg
historian Hugo Ott, it became clear that there were fairly serious problems with Heidegger’s
‘ofﬁcial story’,  which survived more or less unchallenged up through the publication of his well-
known interview with Der Spiegel in 1966 (published posthumously, in keeping with Heidegger’s
wishes, in 1976). A number of French philosophers offered a more balanced and sophisticated
interpretation of ‘l’Affaire Heidegger’ at that time and suggested, for example, that the issue of
Heidegger’s political views in the early 1930s related to a tendency, easily enough conﬁned to
Heidegger’s earlier thought, towards metaphysical humanism, which clearly enough dovetailed
with his option for National Socialism. Conveniently then, the aspects of Heidegger’s ‘later’ thought
that they wanted to preserve remained unsullied by the Nazi stain infecting the earlier work.
However, with this move, the situation becomes all the more complicated since it chimes with the
idea of a ‘turn’ or change in Heidegger’s thinking, which had gained something of a foothold in
Heidegger scholarship, and now offers a rather convenient escape hatch for many Heideggerians.
The idea of a change or turn in Heidegger’s thought, which Gregory Fried aptly characterizes as a
kind of ‘biographical second sailing’, is not one to which I subscribe at all and relies, typically, on a
disastrous misreading of some of Heidegger’s early work, in particular, his magnum opus, Being
and Time. Furthermore, it overlooks the fact that Heidegger’s confrontation with modernity is not
only absolutely consonant with his basic position in Being and Time and remains informed by that
work, it is also based on a fundamental problem in his thought that he never quite manages to
recognize and that is directly related to his political views. Moreover, the aspects of that
confrontation with modernity that are related to this difﬁculty are not suddenly dropped from his
later thought; they remain central to Heidegger’s project to the end of his career.
The stock response by less tractable, ‘hardcore’ Heideggerians to previous attempts to establish
links between his philosophy and his politics was rather dismissive, owing, in the main, to the
philosophical shortcomings of these attempts. And, to be fair, these studies are rightly dismissed
by Heideggerians who can quickly point to the interpretive deﬁciencies of these texts. However,
with that, one is not then entitled to summarily dismiss any question as to a possible relationship
between Heidegger’s philosophy and his politics.
As it happens, Heidegger’s philosophy simply cannot be straightforwardly reduced to his political
views; however, this is something that needs to be demonstrated, since it is Heidegger himself
who says explicitly and repeatedly that the basis for his political views lies in the essence of his
philosophy. Not only that—and this is something that has not been sufﬁciently acknowledged in
previous incarnations of the Heidegger controversy—throughout the 1930s, Heidegger feverishly
looks to articulate a political philosophy on the basis of key concepts in his thought,  including
central notions from Being and Time. This undertaking is fuelled by an attempt to resist modernity
in ways that Heidegger cannot consistently maintain, yet which he thinks he can buttress using the
notion of historicity in Being and Time. That is to say, Heidegger looks to rely on a condition for the
possibility of the way being becomes meaningful for human beings—namely, our temporality or
ﬁnitude—and then, expanding on what he calls the historicity of a person, looks to use this notion
as a way of resisting the universal designs of modernity, valourizing instead the particular or the
provincial. Granted, the facts of our ﬁnitude and historical speciﬁcity bear heavily on how any one
of us has the identity we have, both as individuals and as members of a historically situated
community. However, the concomitant underlying condition is a universal condition for the
possibility of human freedom and thus is a universal, transcendental condition, even in Being and
Time.
Heidegger relies on this same condition to condemn what happened to the inmates in the death
camps during the Second World War and yet, in the 1930s, he wants to use that condition to
privilege the status of the German people in particular. However, since the attempt to do this
cannot possibly succeed and remain consistent with the theoretical foundations of his own
thought, Heidegger is forced, in places, to resort to his own peculiar and somewhat ridiculous
brand of ethnic chauvinism. To make matters worse, there are aspects of this ill-conceived attempt
to formulate a political philosophy (in particular his idiosyncratic brand of anti-modernism) that he
never relinquishes and stubbornly maintains to the end of his life.
What needs to be addressed in this particular controversy is not so much Heidegger’s ‘silence’, his
moral failings, akrasia, opportunism, philandering—though they can serve as something of a
salutary caution against those who continue to deify, in an alarmingly intemperate fashion, a
human being with feet of the most putrid and densely textured clay. The question that needs to be
addressed is not even really how a philosopher that many purport to be the most important thinker
since Hegel could have been a Nazi, since, left in that form, one can see how such a question can
easily be dismissed with counter-examples. Indeed, even when one might want to suggest that
this question retains its signiﬁcance directly as a consequence of the ‘content’ or themes of
Heidegger’s philosophy, the question still does not hit the mark. Rather, the issue is whether and
to what extent Heidegger’s philosophy is related to his politics and that, quite simply, is a question
that has not been adequately addressed. And, despite being personally repugned in the extreme
by the despicable creature that Heidegger was (a man suffering a destitution of moral ﬁbre that is
hard to countenance in such a gifted thinker whose work seems so profoundly important for any
understanding of the human condition), my argument is that his philosophy for the most part
resists his best efforts to reconcile his political views with the key concepts of his thought.
Again, as mentioned above, Heidegger’s attempts to articulate a political philosophy rely heavily
on the notion of historicity in Being and Time; but our historicity is not something that belongs or
pertains exclusively to any particular group of people. Rather, our being-towards-death (and thus
our historicity) is the condition for the possibility of the manner in which being reveals itself as
meaningful for any human being at any time or place whatsoever. Heidegger wants to kick away
this transcendental ladder once he has made use of it, but then wants to use its rungs as a
foothold again to condemn what happened to one particular community in the death camps when
their authentic being-towards-death and thus their historicity was denied them—a community,
moreover, that he insists in a 1933/34 seminar, are without history and thereby lack the capacity to
belong to a state or to be authentic German citizens. In the end, Heidegger cannot possibly
articulate the political philosophy that he wants to and remain consistent with the internal logic of
texts such as Being and Time.
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Mahon O’Brien is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Sussex. This post is based on his
recent book, Heidegger, History, and the Holocaust (Bloomsbury, 2015). He has also published a
book on the concept of ‘authenticity’ in Heidegger’s philosophy and works mainly on 19th and 20th
century European philosophy.
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